Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2000

The State of Utah v. John Legg, Jr. : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jeffrey T. Colemere; Assistant Attorney General; Mark L. Shurtleff; Utah Attorney General;
Attorneys for Appellee.
Catherine E. Lilly; David V. Finlayson; Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.; Attorneys for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Utah v. Legg, Jr., No. 20000428 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/2773

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 20000428-CA
Priority No. 2

JOHN LEGG, JR.,
Defendant/Appellant

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from a judgment of conviction for attempted receiving
or transferring a stolen vehicle, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-la-1316(2) (1998), 76-4-101
(1999) and 76-4-102(3) (1999); burglary of a building, a third
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1999);
and aggravated assault, a third degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1999), in the Third Judicial District
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable
J. Dennis Frederick, Judge, presiding.

CATHERINE E. LILLY (77 4 6)
DAVID V. FINLAYSON (654 0)
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
JEFFREY T. COLEMERE (8 527)
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4 666)
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor .
P. 0. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee

Utah Court of Appeals

MAH 1 S 2001
Pautette Stagg
Clerk of the Court

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v,
Case No. 20000428-CA
Priority No. 2

JOHN LEGG, JR.,
Defendant/Appellant

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from a judgment of conviction for attempted receiving
or transferring a stolen vehicle, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-la-1316(2) (1998), 76-4-101
(1999) and 76-4-1 02(3) (1999); burglary of a building, a third
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1999);
and aggravated as sault, a third degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1999), in the Third Judicial District
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable
J. Dennis Frederi ck, Judge, presiding.
CATHERINE E. LILLY (774 6)
DAVID V. FINLAYSON (654 0)
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
JEFFREY T. COLEMERE (8527)
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4 666)
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P. 0. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHERE IT
DID NOT MAKE FINDINGS ON THE RECORD REGARDING
STATUTORILY PRESCRIBED FACTORS BEARING UPON THE
CONSECUTIVE SENTENCING ORDER
CONCLUSION

.

1
8

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
Barnard v. Sutliff. 846 P. 2d 1229 (Utah 1992)

5

Morse v. Packer. 1999 UT 5, 973 P.2d 422

4, 5, 6

State v. Galli. 967 P.2d 930 (Utah 1998)

1, 6

State v. Jarman, 1999 UT App. 269, 987 P.2d 1284

4

State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991)

2, 7

State v. Robertson. 932 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1997)

2, 6

State v. Schweitzer. 943 P.2d 649 (Utah Ct. App.
1997)

1, 2, 6

STATUTES. RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (1999)
Utah R. Civ. P. 11

1, 2, 3, 4, 5
5,6

ii

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

JOHN LEGG, JR.,

:

Case No. 20000428-CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

ARGUMENT
POINT: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHERE IT
DID NOT MAKE FINDINGS ON THE RECORD REGARDING
STATUTORILY PRESCRIBED FACTORS BEARING UPON THE
CONSECUTIVE SENTENCING ORDER.
The State erroneously contends that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in imposing consecutive sentences even
though it failed to make any findings on the record as to
Appellant John Legg, Jr.fs ("Legg") history, character and
rehabilitative needs - statutorily prescribed factors that a
trial court must adequately consider when imposing consecutive
sentences.

See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(4) (1999) (Consecutive

Sentencing Statute); see also State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930 (Utah
1998) (sentencing court must give "adequate weight" to each
factor set forth in § 76-3-401(4) before imposing consecutive
sentence).

Citing State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649 (Utah Ct.

App. 1997), the State asserts that a sentencing court is deemed
to have adequately considered all relevant factors so long as
pertinent information is in the record before the court at the
time of sentencing.

See Statefs Brief ("S.B.") at Point I.B.

The State's interpretation of Schweitzer is too broad.

As

explained in Leggfs opening brief, his case presents a far less
egregious set of facts.

See Appellant's Brief ("A.B.") at n.l.

Hence, inferring adequate consideration of all relevant facts in
light of the statutorily prescribed factors set forth in § 76-3401(4) is not appropriate here.
Indeed, it is a well-settled principle that this Court may
uphold a lower court's failure to enter findings on the record
only if "it would be reasonable to assume that the court actually
made such findings."
(Utah 1991) .

State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 788 n.6

Assumed findings, however, are inappropriate if the

"ambiguity of the facts makes this assumption unreasonable.''

Id.

at 788; see also State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1234 (Utah
1997) (discussing three circumstances in which it would be
unreasonable to assume trial court made findings, e.g., ambiguous
facts or an explicit mandate by statute or case law that such
findings be made).
The facts are so ambiguous such that it is not reasonable to
assume that the court made the appropriate findings under § 7 6-3401(4).

For example, the gravity of the offenses at issue here

do not unequivocally call for consecutive sentencing.
Code Ann. § 76-3-401(4).

See Utah

Two of the three convictions were for

non-violent property crimes (attempted receiving of a stolen
vehicle and burglary).

R.137 (Judgment, Sentence & Commitment).

2

The injuries sustained by Officer Hamideh were limited,
consisting only of minor scrapes on his calves and hand, plus
slight tearing of his uniform.

R.95.

Moreover, the injuries

occurred to Officer Hamideh because he held onto Leggfs car as
Legg drove away; they were not the result of an intentional act
on Legg ! s part to hurt Officer Hamideh specifically.

R.93-94.

Even the court failed to ascribe a "malevolent intent" to this
incident.

R.158[9].

The other victims in this case, Lindsay and

Sheryl Strasburg, said in their victim impact statements that
Legg f s actions did not result in any physical or emotional
injuries, property damage, medical treatment, counseling, or an
impact on their livelihood or lifestyle.

R.157 (Victim Impact

Statements).
Further ambiguity exists as to Legg!s history, character and
rehabilitative needs, which were not addressed at all by the
lower court.

See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(4); R.158[8-9].

The

State paints an unduly negative picture of Legg and misrepresents
the record to assert that his criminal record includes a number
of felonies.

S.B. 13.

However, as explained by defense counsel

below, his record actually includes only one felony conviction
for business burglary.

R.158[3].

was overturned on appeal.

Id.

The other felony conviction

Another conviction for aggravated

assault was prosecuted as a class A misdemeanor.

Id.

The State additionally paints Legg as a long-time habitual

3

drug user, implying that his addiction contributed to the
incident.

S.B. 7, 13.

Legg admitted a significant drug problem.

R.158[5].

But, he noted to the court that he had been a

"responsible citizen" since he was out of prison, and was using
methamphetamine on this occasion only as a response to the recent
death of his infant son.

R.158[7].

The sentencing judge's exclusive focus on the "serious risk"
that Legg posed to Officer Hamideh establishes ambiguity as to
whether the court properly weighed all the evidence relevant to
the factors set forth in § 76-3-401(4).

Indeed, the record's

silence as to the court's findingsf combined with the ambiguity
of the facts in this case as they relate to the appropriateness
of consecutive sentencing, preclude this Court from adequately
reviewing the consecutive sentencing order.

See State v. Jarman,

1999 UT App. 269, 1 8 n.4, 987 P.2d 1284 (citation omitted)
(upholding trial court order despite lack of requisite written
findings only where oral findings provide sufficient basis for
appellate review).
In addition to the foregoing, the Utah Supreme Court's
opinion in Morse v. Packer, 1999 UT 5, 973 P.2d 422, compels the
conclusion that sentencing courts are required to make findings
on the record in imposing consecutive sentencing under § 76-3401(4).

Looking at the language of the statute at issue, the

Supreme Court held,

4

Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires
that when a court imposes sanctions, "the court shall
describe the conduct determined to constitute a
violation of this rule and explain the basis for the
sanction imposed." Utah R. Civ. P. 11(c)(3). We hold
today that the inverse to this rule also holds. When
denying a rule 11 motion for sanctions, a trial court
must likewise describe the conduct constituting a basis
for the denial. In other words, there should be
findings on the record, or other appropriate
explanation of the trial court's rationale, that will
enable the appellate courts to apply the [Barnard v.1
Sutliffr, 846 P.2d 1229, 1234 (Utah 1992)] standard [of
review].
Morse, 1999 UT at 1 13.

The Morse Court reasoned that review of

a rule 11 motion for sanctions involved a "three-tiered" standard
of review, reviewing factual findings for clear error, legal
conclusions for correctness, and the type and amount of sanction
for abuse of discretion.
at 1234).

Id. at 1 10 (citing Sutliff, 846 P.2d

However, " [a]pplication of the Sutliff standard to the

case in its present posture [was] not possible because of the
lack of any meaningful explanation [on the record] supporting the
district court's order denying sanctions."

Id. at 1 14.

The Morse rationale compels a like conclusion here.

First,

the language of § 76-3-401 indicates that findings on the record
are necessary.

Using language similar to that of Utah R. Civ. P.

11, section 76-3-401 provides that

vv

(l) [a] court shall

determine

. . . whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences. . .
. [and] (4) . . . shall

consider

the gravity and circumstances of

the offenses and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs
of the defendant in determining

whether to impose consecutive
5

sentences."

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (emphasis added); compare

Utah R. Civ. P. 11(3) ("the court shall
determined

describe

the conduct

to constitute a violation of this rule and explain

basis for the sanction imposed").

the

The act of "consider[ing]" and

"determin[ing]" implies a logical process that must be reflected
in the record by way of findings.

See Robertson, 932 P.2d at

1224-25 (unreasonable to assume trial court made findings if
statute or case law require that such findings be made).
Additionally, the standard of review applied to consecutive
sentencing orders necessitates findings so that this Court may
conduct an adequate appellate review.

See Morse, 1999 UT at SI 14

("lack of any meaningful explanation supporting [] court's order"
precludes appellate review).

Consecutive sentencing orders are

reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

See Galli, 967 P.2d at 938.

Although deference is granted to the trial court, this Court must
be able to understand the lower court's findings to determine
whether its consecutive sentencing decision was reasonable under
the circumstances.

See Schweitzer, 943 P.2d at 651.

Absent any

findings on the record by which to apply this standard of review,
this Court is precluded from carrying out its appellate function.
This Court should remand for resentencing rather than for
entry of findings in order to avoid hindsight justification.
Remanding for findings at this juncture would only tempt the
court to make a "post hoc rationalization" for its consecutive

6

sentencing order.

Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 789 (remanding for new

trial rather than entry of findings where trial court failed to
make findings as to constitutional reliability of eyewitness
identification evidence).
As a final matter, significant policies support this Court's
intervention.

First, the sentencing judgefs summary reliance

solely upon the possible danger that Legg presented to Hamideh
reflects an all-too-common tendency among sentencing courts to
make over-simplified and ambiguous orders, which result in
appeals to clarify the sentencing decision.

It also prevents

appellate courts from adequately reviewing such decisions.
supra.

See

Moreover, the absence of findings gives the Board of

Pardons little guidance when defendants appear to request parole.
Sentencing judges also miss an important opportunity to admonish
defendants and to steer them toward rehabilitation and a changed
life.

More importantly, summary and ambiguous sentencing

decisions have the appearance of unfairness and give defendants
disincentives to rehabilitate themselves.

Requiring courts to

make findings on the record when imposing a consecutive sentence
would avoid these dangers.1

Legg submits on his opening brief in response to the
State's arguments not specifically addressed herein.

7

CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, and for the reasons set forth in
his opening brief, Legg requests this Court to vacate his
consecutive sentence and remand for resentencing to concurrent
terms.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

/<7^ day of March, 2001.

u%

CATHERINE E. LILLY
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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